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The European Union: the
polycentric climate policy leader?
Tim Rayner∗ and Andrew Jordan
The European Union’s (EU) claims to be a leader in international climate policy
are well known. Since the early 1990s, a rich and vibrant academic literature has
analyzed the internal sources and international consequences of its leadership
aspirations, especially in relation to the challenges of mitigation. More recently,
attention has turned to adaptation policy. The literature highlights how policy
actors have successfully exploited many of the opportunities afforded by the EU’s
‘polycentric’ form, while minimizing its downsides, but that acute challenges
lie ahead, particularly if a strong global-level framework remains elusive. It
has continually underlined the fact that the EU’s climate policy activities have
enormous relevance well beyond European borders. Both in terms of its role as a
driver of international policy and a source of transferable policy lessons on how to
govern in ‘polycentric’ settings, appreciating the EU’s experience is vital for those
seeking to understand the governance of climate change, both within and between
states. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) claims, with somejustification, to be a global leader in climate
policy. Since the early 1990s, a growing literature
has explored many different facets of its governing
activities. Although in many ways a sui generis
system of polycentric or, in EU parlance, multilevel
governance, the EU’s experience in handling a
range of climate governance dilemmas arguably
has a much wider relevance, especially to broadly
similar governance systems—including other regional
groupings of states, as well as federal and/or quasi-
federal states—with which it is often compared.1–6 As
the long-standing commentator on EU climate policy
Jørgen Wettestad (p. 26) has put it, ‘both its relative
diversity and institutional strength indicate that the
EU can be looked upon as a rather benign ‘‘critical
case’’: if [it] cannot develop effective climate policies,
then the implications for the globe are grim.’7 The
realpolitik of international climate policy, in which
the EU is seeking to build alliances with other major
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emitters that currently lie outside the Kyoto Protocol,
also highlights the need to understand the sources and
effects of climate governance in Europe.8 So whether
in terms of its global implications or the academic
response it has provoked, the EU’s experience in
governing climate policy is hugely important.
In her editorial essay on the WIRES climate
policy and governance theme, Harriet Bulkeley
highlighted a number of important subthemes.9
Among these are the diverse levels and spaces in
which climate governance takes place and policy
is enacted, the interaction between policy-making
venues at different scales, issues of where power and
authority lie, and how these might be researched
and understood (p. 312). Another subtheme has to
do with sectors, including how responsibilities (and
associated costs) are allocated for the twin imperatives
of mitigation and adaptation. All of these have been
brought vividly to life in the academic literature on
EU climate policy, which has grown significantly
since the early 1990s. In a world struggling to
arrive at binding, multilateral agreements to tackle
climate change, the EU’s inherent polycentricity—i.e.,
its active encouragement of experimental efforts at
multiple levels, with active steering of actors at local,
regional, and national levels—has become steadily
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more relevant and fascinating to scholars.10 On
the face of it, the EU has managed to deliver a
great deal. It has handled burden sharing between
industry and other sectors in novel ways, pioneered
the use of emissions trading across borders,11,12 and
it is beginning to consider how responsibilities for
reducing the EU’s vulnerability to future climate
impacts might be implemented.13,14
This article reviews the debates that have arisen
around the governance of climate change since the
EU first began to address the issue in the late 1970s,
and how they have been reflected in the academic
literature. It reflects on the current political context,
and where both policy and academic research is
heading in the future. While acknowledging the EU’s
significance as an international actor (especially after
what looked like a revival in its ability to steer
the international regime at the 2011 Durban UN
climate conference), because of space constraints we
mostly concentrate on its inner workings. We refer
the reader to other summaries of its ‘external’ role
in the international climate regime.15–22 Although
we have minimized references to theoretical debates
over the dynamics of European integration that
characterize much of the literature, we do assume
a basic understanding of the main policy-making
institutions and procedures of the EU; readers who
lack this may want to consult one of the many relevant
textbooks on the EU23 or its broader environmental
policies.24
The main theme running through this article
is the complex relationship between policy leadership
and polycentricity. Generally speaking, the more levels
of governance in a system, the more the opportunities
for policy innovation. The possible drawback is that
if each level opts for policies that conflict with one
another, the policy system as a whole risks policy
incoherence and/or complete gridlock. This article
asks how successfully policy makers in the EU have
been able to exploit the opportunities for policy
leadership afforded by its polycentric form, while
reducing the potential downsides, often characterized
as ‘decision traps’.25 It shows that the EU’s ambitious
(or ‘leading’) climate policies are both a product of
its internal polycentric form and a potential source
of lessons for similar governance systems seeking to
govern climate change. But it also cautions against
seeing polycentricity as an inherently ‘good’ thing or
assuming that the more levels there are the better;
indeed, it highlights how the continuing lack of a
predictable framework at the higher (i.e., global) level
may negatively affect the EU’s future capacity to lead.
After a brief elaboration of the concept of
polycentricity and its relevance to climate policy, this
article offers a short chronological overview of the
key landmarks in the development of EU policy over
the last three decades. Successive sections then explore
how scholars have analyzed the constituent processes
and outputs associated with these landmarks, and take
stock of the emerging challenges currently facing both
EU climate policy makers and scholars, highlighting
potential future research opportunities. To some
extent, the themes in the literature mirror the well-
known ‘stages’ of the policy process, moving from
agenda setting to policy adoption, implementation,
and evaluation. A concluding section offers further
reflection on the relevance of the concept of
polycentricity in EU climate policy as well as future
research needs in this rich and highly dynamic area of
scholarship.
CLIMATE POLICY LEADERSHIP IN
POLYCENTRIC SYSTEMS
Conventional collective-action theory predicts that in
situations where actors are reluctant to undertake
expensive measures because the benefits from doing
so will be diffuse, an external authority is needed to
determine appropriate actions to be taken, monitor
behavior, and if necessary impose sanctions. In
climate policy, this tends to equate to advocacy of
a top-down, multilateral system in which states are
assigned emission reduction targets and a timetable
to achieve them, a position recently reiterated by
Hare et al.26 The concept of polycentricity essentially
refers to circumstances where, rather than a single
monocentric unit attempting to govern, multiple
governing authorities are active at many different
scales. According to Ostrom (Ref 10), the fact that
multiple benefits (including, for example, increased
energy security and employment opportunities) are
generated at diverse scales from mitigation efforts,
even in the absence of central direction, makes
polycentricity a useful analytical approach for
understanding climate change governance, and indeed
informing the design of policies. She argues that
although by no means perfect, polycentricity has
considerable advantages in offering greater scope for
experimentation by multiple actors, leading to mutual
monitoring and learning. She further asserts that it
leads to more equitable, effective, and sustainable
outcomes. Whether these things actually appear in
practice is, of course, an important empirical question.
Among the disadvantages of polycentricity that
Ostrom recognizes are the possibilities that efforts
by multiple governments and other organizations
involved in reducing emissions may give rise to
‘major leakages, inconsistent policies, inadequate
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certification, gaming the system, and free riding’
(Ref 10, p. 551). The need for a degree of
oversight from high-level actors is therefore clearly
recognized: ‘[a]s larger units get involved, problems
associated with non-contributors, local tyrants,
and inappropriate discrimination can be addressed
and major investments made in new scientific
information and innovations’. At what point increased
involvement from larger units would shift a
polycentric system into a monocentric one is,
however, debatable.
Monocentricity and polycentricity are best seen
as points on a continuum. As in many other aspects
of governance, a key issue is how best to combine
the preferred features of both (in practice, the
mix really does matter). In the EU, a polycentric
system of governance has developed which mixes
different elements in highly complex and unique ways
(Ref 23). Thus, theMember States allow the European
Commission the power to act as guardian of what are
perceived to be Europe-wide interests by proposing
legislation that, if adopted, is binding across all 27
countries. By doing so, situations in which conflicting
national approaches threaten the free movement of
goods across borders—the facilitation of which may
be regarded as the EU’s core mission—can be avoided.
Once legislation is adopted, forms of free-riding, non-
implementation, or discrimination by Member States
can be sanctioned by the European Court of Justice,
and potentially enforced through fines. However, it is
only if such proposals are jointly adopted by national
governments (acting through a joint body known as
the Council) and the European Parliament that EU-
wide legislation can come into effect. In some areas,
such as energy and land-use planning, Member States
have insisted on preserving a high degree of autonomy,
or in the language of the EU, ‘subsidiarity’, and
the Commission’s competence to propose common
policies is relatively limited.
THE EMERGENCE OF EU CLIMATE
POLICY
Despite its current reputation for leadership, it is
important to note that the EU’s policies on climate
change have been over 30 years in the making. The
situation has evolved from the late 1970swhen climate
science began to feature as a small aspect of research
programs, to a position in 2013 when a wide range
of economic and social activities in Member States
are influenced, to varying degrees, by policy initiatives
originating at EU level.27
Relevant policies and measures began to be
put in place from the late 1980s, albeit that their
primary motivations were often to do with securing
environmental and energy policy objectives, rather
than climate change mitigation benefits per se.
While at this time most policies were developed
and adopted at Member State level, in preparation
for the 1992 Rio ‘Earth Summit’, the Commission
launched what it called an integrated package of
legislative proposals for the EU as a whole, covering
energy efficiency, renewable energies, a monitoring
mechanism for CO2 emissions and a combined tax
on the carbon/energy content of fuels. Through the
new monitoring mechanism (Decision 93/389/EEC),
all Member States were required to ‘devise, publish,
and implement national programmes’ to manage their
emissions. The renewable energy proposal (Decision
93/500/EEC) was adopted in 1993, but included more
modest targets and more limited funding than had
been hoped. The proposed carbon/energy tax—even in
diluted form—proved far too radical for the majority
of Member States,28 especially as the European
economy slipped further into recession, and was
eventually withdrawn in 2002.29
Following the publication (in 1995) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Second
Assessment Report, EU environment ministers
resolved that global average temperatures ‘should
not exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels’ and
that this target ‘should guide global limitation and
reduction efforts’ (paras. 3 and 6).30 While the origins
of, and scientific rationale for this aim have been
much debated,31 the 2 degree target has proven to be
enduringly important for the EU, as both a long-term
policy guiding goal and a visible expression of its
commitment to international leadership.
With the Kyoto Conference of the Parties to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
looming, in 1997 the EU agreed a significant internal
‘burden sharing’ arrangement among its then 15
members, on the basis of which the Union as a
whole advocated a 15% reduction by industrialized
countries.32 This agreement allowed less developed
Member States ‘headroom’ to grow and increase their
emissions, while quite substantial reductions were
made by the richer, more environmentally progressive
member states. This development marked another
significant landmark in the evolution of EU climate
policy—even if subsequently the Kyoto Protocol
required a lesser, 8% reduction on 1990 levels by
2012. The Kyoto Protocol’s targets and timetables
approach very much reflected the EU’s traditional,
regulatory approach to governing. The mid-1990s
also saw discussions on how to tackle steadily rising
emissions from road transport culminate in an EU
strategy to reduce CO2 from cars (COM (95) 689)
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and improve vehicle efficiency by 25% in 10 years.
The centerpiece was a voluntary agreement between
the Commission and vehicle manufacturers, signed in
1998 (Ref 29).
In order to ensure delivery of its Kyoto target,
in March 2000 the Commission began to develop
‘common and coordinated policies and measures’,
using a multistakeholder process known as the
European Climate Change Programme. Member
States acknowledged that without common policy
measures, their own national efforts combined would
not be sufficient. The major policy to emerge at this
time was the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS),
a system in which allowances to emit would be
allocated and made tradable in a carbon market, in
order to incentivise the most cost-effective forms of
abatement (Refs 11 and 12). About 40% of the EU’s
total greenhouse gas emissions were covered by the
system. Member States were given responsibility to
produce national allocation plans, which set out the
total cap for their domestic emissions and the more
specific distribution among relevant installations. The
Commission could reject plans deemed insufficiently
ambitious in view of the EU’s Kyoto commitment.
The associated Directive was adopted in 2003; its first
(pilot) phase commenced in 2005. Compared to the
ill-fated carbon/energy tax proposal (see above), this
constituted rapid progress.33 This, and a series of other
directives that followed, apparently signaled a trend
toward deeper, faster, and smoother harmonization
in the area of climate policy than had been possible in
the 1990s.34,35
Looking to the situation after 2012, the
Commission called for a range of new policies to
support a 20% reduction in emissions by 2020
‘to demonstrate international leadership’, rising to
30% if other states agreed to make comparable
effort.36 Throughout 2008, a package of proposals of
unprecedented scale and complexity was negotiated.
Labeled 20, 20 by 2020—Europe’s Climate Change
Opportunity (COM (2008) 30), it encompassed new
legislation on emissions trading, renewable energy,
vehicle emissions, and carbon capture and storage.37
Most of the reduction effort (21% by 2020 from
a 2005 baseline) was to be delivered by a new
phase of emissions trading, from 2013 to 2020, in
a system where total emissions would be capped, and
allowances allocated, centrally. This replacement of
nationally-based allocation of allowances represented
a major increase in the powers of the Commission,
and promised a major boost to the instrument’s
effectiveness.38 For the ‘non-trading’ sectors outside
the ETS (e.g. transport, agriculture, and waste),
together accounting for 60% of total EU greenhouse
gas emissions, reductions of 10%were to be achieved,
with varying national targets set out in a new ‘effort
sharing’ Decision (406/2009/EC)—the word ‘burden’
having been replaced by a more palatable term. A
revised directive set a separate target and burden
sharing arrangements for renewable energy, with
failure to reach mandatory national targets incurring
financial penalties. A new regulation on passenger car
emissions replaced the poorly implemented voluntary
agreement with manufacturers, suggesting a shift
away from softer modes of governance toward the
kind of hierarchical regulation that in the 1990s would
have been deemed far too heavy-handed.
Around this time, however, the European
economy was hit by an unexpected financial crisis,
slipping into a recession that was deeply challenging
for those advocating stronger climate policies. With
governments prioritizing reductions of public sector
debt burdens and the protection of jobs, ‘ecologically
modern’ arguments that unilaterally adopting a 30%
reduction target would ultimately improve the EU’s
global competitiveness gained little traction, even
though the 20% reduction target will almost certainly
be achieved comfortably. Even so, a target of 30% by
2020 falls well short of what many scientists suggest
is required to give any realistic chance of holding
mean global temperature increase below 2◦C.39 In
recognition that even achieving this target would leave
a range of climate impacts requiring some kind of
response, a White Paper in 2009 marked the first
formal involvement of the EU in adaptation policy,
until then the preserve of national, regional, and local
actors. The Commission undertook to integrate or
‘mainstream’ adaptation concerns in fields where it
had policy competence and to facilitate increased
national-level actions through funding research and
knowledge exchange with a view to formulating a
more comprehensive strategy (Ref 13) after 2013.40,41
EU CLIMATE POLICY: THE
EVOLUTION OF A LITERATURE
Policy Emergence: Opportunities and
Constraints
As noted above, this short overview highlights
how a single point of steering in a polycentric
system such as the EU can potentially deliver many
opportunities to develop ambitious policies—but in
certain conditions also throw up constraints. The
early 1990s saw a number of attempts to account
for the emergence of a common climate policy in such
a setting. These were notable for the way in which
they downplayed rational-choice, interest-oriented
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explanations, highlighting instead the importance of
learning and the social construction of problems
and identities. Jachtenfuchs, for example, highlighted
how ‘frames’ structured problem definitions and
thus opened up or prevented new possibilities for
action.42,43 Jachtenfuchs also emphasized that what
the EU learned, in terms of its response to the
climate challenge, was conditioned by how the issue
was perceived in relation to the long-standing meta
objective of closer European economic integration.
Between 1988 and 1991, a major ‘frame shift’
occurred in the EU’s environmental policy, away from
seeing the economy and the environment as separate,
toward a new ‘sustainability frame’ which integrated
the two domains, and saw strong environmental
regulation as potentially economically beneficial.
For policy makers in the Commission, putting this
‘sustainability frame’ into practice by means of an EU-
wide carbon tax would promote the goal of European
integration and give the Union a stronger global
diplomatic identity. Fortuitously, the rise of interest
in climate change coincided with a peaking in public
concern and with a high degree of optimism regarding
the wider integration project. As noted above, in
practice things did not turn out this way.
While not denying them, these early interpreta-
tions tended to underplay the importance of a range of
barriers and constraints on the ambition of EU climate
action. But as it became clear that early enthusiasm
for these new policy frames might not be enough to
adopt ambitious legislation, that the issue might, in the
words of one early analyst, be ‘too hot to handle’,44
a number of explanatory factors were sought. These
have recurred in later literature. Some commentators
drew from traditional, political economy conceptions
of the power of actors with vested interests in the
continuation of carbon-intensive industries and ways
of life.45 Industrial lobbyists were seen to be far better
financed than environmental groups, a situation which
appears relatively unchanged.46 New literatures also
highlighted relative lobbying skill of different sections
of industry as a significant factor explaining the form
taken by particular policy instruments, but especially
emissions trading.47
Others highlighted the EU’s lack of legal
competence to act in key areas, namely energy and
fiscal policy, where Member States insisted on high
levels of subsidiarity.48 This would remain the case
for as long as Member States controlled the pace
and extent of European integration, always putting
their interests first, as liberal-intergovernmental theory
suggested they would.49 As a system of polycentric
governance, the EU lacked a central core executive,
able to impose agreement and drive climate policy
forward. Instead, actors at a number of ‘veto points’
could either block adoption of a new proposal or, if
it was passed, obstruct its full implementation.50,51
To this list, Dahl added the relative lack of financial
resources available to EU-level climate policy makers,
compared to agriculture or regional policy domains.52
A further subtheme in the literature highlighted
how ideologically, the EU has tended to prioritize
competitiveness, the completion of the single market
and economic liberalization, and that the pursuit
of these policy objectives is not always conducive
to climate policy goals.53,54 Finally, more recent
contributions have reflected on how far the expansion
of the EU to incorporate newer and relatively poor
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe
has constrained the EU’s ambitions, at least in some
respects, after 2004.55–58
Policy Leaders and Distributed Leadership
The question of who provides leadership in polycen-
tric governance systems is a highly salient one. The
EU’s apparent ability to overcome various constraints
and adopt such significant policy innovations as the
burden/effort sharing agreements and the ETS rightly
constitutes a significant theme in the literature. In
light of these policy innovations, several authors have
explored the concept of leadership, expressed both in
terms of developments within the Union, and the EU’s
ability to influence negotiations over the global cli-
mate regime.59–61 These aspects were acknowledged
to be closely related, with some suggesting that the
‘compliance pull’ and incentives associated with the
Kyoto Protocol increased the willingness of EU gov-
ernments to implement innovative policy instruments
of a kind that would not have diffused horizontally
between states as easily as diffusion theory would lead
us to expect.62,63 It was important, therefore, always
to view the 27 Member States as existing under the
framework of EU policy making, which in turn is
‘nested’ in a much wider global regime.64
For Gupta and Grubb,59 the concept of the
EU’s leadership can be divided into three types:
‘directional’, ‘structural’, and ‘instrumental’. These
could describe the actions of the EU as a bloc
globally, or of those offering leadership within
it. Directional leadership rests on unilateral action
and the demonstration effect associated with it.65
Structural leadership could be exercised by an actor
able to take actions or deploy power resources that
create incentives for others. Some have credited
Germany in particular with structural leadership
within the EU.66 As a powerful economy, Germany
is more able to ‘upload’ its regulatory preferences to
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the institutions of the EU, to ensure that its (in many
cases) ambitious standards do not place its industry
at a competitive disadvantage. Finally, instrumental
leadership involves the linkage of issues and coalition
building to arrive at agreements. This literature has a
strongly normative flavor, offering recommendations
as to how EU leadership can be enhanced. Later
contributors added a further type, described variously
as cognitive or ideas-based (Ref 60), more akin to the
concept of policy entrepreneurship.
In terms of internal leadership, analysts used
the concept of policy entrepreneurship to explain
how the Commission in particular, but also certain
Member States periodically taking their turn as
Presidencies of the European Council, have overcome
the institutional and interest-based barriers noted
above, to reach agreement on policy innovations
such as the ETS (Ref 33) and the burden sharing
agreements (more on which below; Ref 32). As
advocates of polycentricity would suggest, multiple
benefits, in addition to emission reductions, were
indeed emphasized to build a coalition in favor of such
innovations. For example, improved energy security
and employment prospects have been used effectively
to promote the merits of renewable energy.67,68 For
Skjaerseth and Wettestad, the concept of ‘epistemic
leadership’ constitutes a subcategory within the broad
category of entrepreneurial leadership. It captures
how a small group of dedicated individuals working
within the European Commission and sharing the
same belief in emissions trading, built up independent
expertise on how the instrument could be designed and
mobilized support from state and non-state actors at
various levels of decision making.69 Skjaerseth and
Wettestad draw the lesson that this type of leadership
may be needed more generally to deal with a variety
of other challenges characterized by high scientific
uncertainty and social complexity in which learning
is pertinent: ‘[s]earching, learning and innovation are
emerging as standard features of negotiations rather
than exceptions’ (p. 312).
While some Member States were portrayed as
‘pushers’ or forerunners, and efforts made to outline
and explain the strategies adopted by them,70 none
was seen to ‘push’ consistently across all policy issues.
Arguably, in climate policy no one EU institution
has offered a consistent lead either (although the
European Parliament is routinely acknowledged to
be the ‘greenest’).71 This finding presented analysts
with something of a paradox. In one particularly
significant contribution to the literature, Schreurs
and Tiberghien suggested that the EU’s capacity to
innovate (in effect to offer directional leadership)
derived from a phenomenon they dubbed ‘competitive
multi-level reinforcement’.72 Since the mid-1990s,
actors operating at different levels of governance
have become adept at ‘passing the baton’ (p.25)
of leadership from one to another, in such a way
that veto-points have not been as significant as
might have been imagined. In this way, the EU’s
polycentricity—principally its open and pluralistic
governance structure—was seen to be beneficial.
Policy makers were, they argued, less troubled than
they would be in a single national government
by electoral concerns and the profile of climate
change concerns in the issue attention cycle. A
more nuanced and empirically complete picture was
offered by Jordan et al.35 who highlighted that
policy development has not been nearly as linear
and consistent as Schreurs and Tiberghien’s account
suggested, and how it has relied on a relatively small
set of policy instrument types. Jordan et al. also
question the longer term sustainability of the EU’s
endeavor to exert global leadership, a theme to which
we return below.
Equity and Political Solidarity
As we have noted, the more polycentric a governance
system, the greater the likelihood that its component
parts pursue different and possibly incoherent
approaches. While these differences can in principle
be a source of policy innovation (with leaders learning
from laggards), it can also generate inequitable
relationships, which over time may undermine
political solidarity among the various component
parts, and other policy incompatibilities which
together undermine problem solving capacity (Ref 25).
A number of scholars have highlighted the importance
of the EU’s concern for solidarity among its members,
and with solutions perceived as broadly equitable, as
one key aspect of its capacity to show leadership.
From the earliest days of EU climate change policy,
the ‘asymmetrical interests’ that the issue generates
among Member States have been regularly identified
as key obstacles to agreement on common policies
(Ref 44). These include differences in: the likely
impacts of climate change; economic development;
predicted energy demand; capacity for fuel switching
and energy saving potentials.73 At the same time,
it has also been observed that regardless of these
asymmetries, when compared to most international
regimes, the EU is well-equipped with governing
capacities and trust among parties to develop common
policy, for example, through regional infrastructure
(in EU parlance ‘cohesion’) spending (Ref 44).
The 1997 burden sharing agreement allocated
the EU’s Kyoto target between Member States
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
WIREs Climate Change EU: the polycentric climate policy leader?
on the basis of a so-called triptych approach.74,75
Emissions were treated as arising from three sectors:
power generation, energy-intensive industry, and a
third sector covering all other activities including
domestic, commercial, transport, and agriculture.
A methodology was used to determine emissions
allowances for the three sectors, which, when added
together, gave theMember States’ targets. Contrary to
expectations that such differentiated agreements are
highly unlikely in international treaty making among
industrialized countries (Ref 32) and in EU climate
policy making in particular,76 an agreement was
struck. Moreover, it appears to have been negotiated
without recourse to Community financial instruments,
whereby direct side-payments are made to poorer
Member States. A number of analyses have attempted
to establish how equity issues were addressed, and
showed that, on average, less wealthy countries were
assigned lower targets than the more wealthy.77,78
As part of its post-2012 drive, the EU has
adopted a two-part ‘effort sharing’ strategy, using
a formulaic approach mainly based on the principles
of solidarity and capability. Boston and Stephenson2
suggest that the simplicity, flexibility, and relatively
equitable nature of the framework for determining
effort sharing on emissions reductions and renewable
energy growth are characteristics that have ensured
broad political acceptance across the relatively diverse
range of EU countries.
Policy Instruments: Different Mixes and
Packages
Once policy goals have been agreed, attention soon
turns to the choice among the various instruments
to achieve them, be they traditional, hierarchical
direct regulation, market-based mechanisms, or more
network-based approaches based on trust between
actors.79,80 In polycentric governance systems, this
choice can be especially productive of political conflict.
Not surprisingly, how the range of instruments
deployed to deliver climate policy goals has evolved,
both at EU and national levels, has been a particularly
dynamic area of scholarship. Some have sought to
identify whether, given that national climate policies
are discussed in and promoted by international
institutions, convergence is evident in the instruments
adopted. Analysis by Albrecht and Arts suggested that
in most European countries, the explorative phase of
climate policy evolved into the selection and further
elaboration of a set of core measures (especially in the
energy and transport sectors), implying a degree of
convergence of policy outputs.81
However, patterns of instrument use have been
shown to remain messy and in flux, presenting
analytical challenges to which scholars have yet to
adequately rise (Ref 79). Consequently, it is unclear
whether or not polycentricty makes it relatively
easier or harder to create effective policy instrument
packages. Investigations of the extent to which ‘new’
environmental policy instruments are being deployed
in general have begun to reach into the climate
policy domain, as it is widely seen to be one
of the more dynamic areas of EU environmental
policy. A combination of actor preferences and
institutional factors has been seen to underlie the
limited use of voluntary agreements, struggles to use
labeling schemes, and the continuing failure to agree
ambitious eco-taxes (Ref 28). Innovation, in the sense
defined by Benson and Jordan,82,83 has only really
been detected with respect to emissions trading, but
even here, the EU ETS exhibits a curious hybrid
form, encompassing a strong element of regulation.84
Otherwise, instruments tend to be layered on top of
one another.
Ultimately, it is fair to say that the EU
remains deeply wedded to fairly traditional forms of
regulation. For sure, it has successfully ‘imported’
instruments first used outside Europe (emission
trading was originally pioneered in the USA) and
built on pre-existing instrument choices made at
the Member State level (witness, for example, the
various attempts to use voluntary agreements and
informational devices), but au fond it remains
a regulatory state—reminding us of well-known
limitations on its ability creatively to select and deploy
different combinations of policy instruments (Ref 80).
So whereas the responsibility for governing climate
policy targets, goals, and timetables does seem to be
steadily accumulating at EU level, the power to choose
and fine-tune policy instruments is not. For scholars
of polycentric governance, this is a puzzling pattern.
Adapting to Climate Change
Since around 2005, the perceived need to prepare for,
and respond to, the impacts of climatic change has
widened the scope of EU climate policy and opened
up new avenues for research. It is nowwidely accepted
that key sectors, including agriculture, forestry, water,
coastal zone management, biodiversity, and health,
will experience effects to which actors will have to
adapt.85 One question to attract scholarly attention
has been why the EU has been so slow to develop
common policy in the area—only producing a White
Paper on adaptation in 2009—in comparison with
its efforts on mitigation, and to pioneering action by
a number of Member States. One obvious answer
was that policy makers feared that taking adaptation
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more seriously could undermine the EU’s leadership
position on mitigation (Ref 13). Another was that
the EU lacked sufficient competence to act in the
critical area of land-use planning, where Member
States guard their sovereignty particularly closely.86
In the EU, the question of legal competence is, as
we have noted, hugely important in terms of defining
what is or is not possible. In this sense, the degree of
polycentricity can be seen as somewhat greater in the
adaptation domain, although whether or not greater
harmonization is warranted remains unclear.
But other factors have also been seen to be
at play. Emphasizing how problems are framed in
relation to the institutional context in which solutions
can be developed, Rayner and Jordan13 suggest that in
part the EU has acted more slowly because the whole
issue of adaptation does not (at least for now) connect
so clearly and directly to the standard rationales for
EU action noted above, namely the development of an
internal market in products and services. Moreover,
when compared to mitigation, states are less reliant on
one another to achieve policy results, and no global,
hierarchical set of policy targets and timetables exerts
a ‘compliance pull’ to galvanize a collective response.
With the national level being the most active
site of policy innovation, comparative analyses of
the content of national adaptation strategies have
appeared which reveal who is doing what.87–89
Strategies have been shown to resemble one another
quite closely in terms of topics, methods, and
approaches, and to face similar institutional and
implementational challenges, including multilevel
governance and sectorized policy making. Such studies
are in danger of being overtaken quite quickly by
events, however, in such a rapidly evolving policy
field. An emerging interest in the role of solidarity
in adapting to climate impacts, and how far existing
instruments provide for it, is also evident.90
EMERGING THEMES AND DEBATES
The Effectiveness of EU Policy
According to Ostrom,13 mutual monitoring, learning,
and adjustment of policy as a result, are advan-
tages normally associated with polycentric systems.
The EU, however, is well known for its ‘implemen-
tation gaps’—in terms of both the transposition and
enforcement of legislation by national authorities, and
whether the targets enshrined in policies are ultimately
reached. These gaps of course are not unique to climate
policy; they affect most other EU policy areas includ-
ing the environment.91 Nonetheless, with EU climate
policies having been in place for a significant length
of time, the scale of implementation gaps is emerging
as a potentially very interesting area for research.
Some, such as contributors to the volume edited
by Peeters and Deketelaere92 frame implementation
in strictly legal terms, and are thus interested less
in the ultimate effectiveness of policy interventions.
Others are now becoming more interested in the
ultimate effectiveness of the EU’s climate policies, i.e.,
what they deliver in terms of greater mitigation and
adaptation. One criticism leveled at the literature on
leadership has been that it neglected the question
of how far the EU’s efforts to lead by example
were matched by policy-induced emission reductions
obtained—or even undermined by their absence (Ref
59). Surprisingly, it was not until an analysis by
Kerr, criticizing claims by politicians from developed
countries that their policies were causing emissions
reduction as largely unsubstantiated, that the issue
of effectiveness really began to receive more focused
attention.93 European policy makers, Kerr suggested,
could present themselves as leaders, safe in the
knowledge that their emission reductions targets
would be met largely as the fortuitous by-product
of ‘non-climate’ policy developments and economic
restructuring, most notably the UK’s ‘dash for gas’
in the energy sector and the collapse of many heavy
industries in the former East Germany. In this sense,
the EU could be regarded as succumbing to one of the
dangers of polycentrism identified by Ostrom, that of
free-riding by some actors on the efforts of others.
More recently, researchers have developed this
insight by examining the nature and extent of
policy evaluation practices, finding a highly variable
picture.94,95 Lack of monitoring and evaluation has
proven to be far less of an issue in the ETS; the
significance of this instrument to the EU’s ability to
deliver its Kyoto commitment has meant that it is
more closely monitored by policy makers and also
evaluated for its mitigation performance by pressure
groups and academic researchers.96,97
It is also important to recognize how the out-
comes of EU environmental governance generally are
significantly affected by policy interactions which ren-
der any assessment of the effectiveness of individual
instruments deeply problematic.98 Glachant et al.’s
study of the implementation of EU environmental
directives found the impact of policy interactions
on outcomes to be pervasive.99 Interactions occurred
with pre-existing but more ambitious domestic poli-
cies covering the same environmental problem, other
environmental policies emerging at the national, EU or
international level, as well as non-environmental poli-
cies such as energy market liberalization. This being
the case, the implementation of an EU Directive must
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be seen as part of a ‘complex patchwork of dynamic
interactions across a multi-level andmulti-centred pol-
icy system’ (pp. 243–244). An interesting coalescing
of research on policy instruments and effectiveness is
thus apparent.
As the EU comes under increased pressure to
demonstrate the effectiveness of its mitigation efforts,
more interest is likely to be paid to the practices
of policy evaluation. The revision of the monitoring
mechanism that was first introduced in 1993 provides
researchers with new opportunities to focus on
this under-researched area. Ostrom’s suggestion that
polycentricity leads tomutual monitoring and learning
(in this case about the most effective means of
reducing emissions) presupposes the existence of
broadly consistent ways of measuring effectiveness,
and of evaluating costs and benefits of policies and
measures. Arguably, although the EU’s ‘monitoring
mechanism’ requires a minimum level of information
to be collected and shared, a lack of prioritization
and investment in relevant infrastructure, and lack of
consistency in monitoring and evaluation practices,100
has meant that the potential benefits of polycentricity
have not yet been fully realized. This is an area that
merits much greater research, given that innovative
policies may not necessarily be ‘better’ policies.
Mitigating and Adapting: A
Meta-coordination Challenge?
In the post-Kyoto era, the EU faces critical decisions
regarding both mitigation and adaptation. Regarding
mitigation, it must decide whether and how far to
increase its level of ambition, given the potential for
emissions to ‘leak’ due to the relocation of industry
to less strictly regulated jurisdictions. But even a 30%
target falls short of what many scientists suggest is
required to give any realistic chance of holding mean
global temperature increase below 2◦C. This means
that consciously or not, the EU’s political leaders are
accepting a future in which the world has to adapt to
increases significantly in excess of 2◦C, the target to
which the Union is, at least officially, still committed.
In addition to its mitigation efforts, the EUmust there-
fore also confront more explicitly the issue of how to
ensure effective adaptive action in preparation for
climate impacts on European territory, and elsewhere,
potentially at the more severe end of projections.101
Globally, the challenges are considerable. With
the failure to advance international climate targets
at Copenhagen in late 2009, the prospect of up to
4◦C mean warming by 2100 (and potentially rather
sooner) arguably means that it may not be enough
simply to ‘climate-proof’ business as usual; instead, a
more ‘transformative’ adaptation, engendering a more
fundamental questioning of existing development
models and how they may work to exacerbate
vulnerabilities, may be required.102 At EU level, how
far decision makers in the most powerful sectors will
be willing to see a correspondingly radical overhaul
of policy, particularly in relation to spending (where
the ‘mainstreaming’ agenda requires less support for
‘maladaptive’ or carbon-intensive investments and
more for mitigation and adaptation actions) remains
a moot point at the time of writing, and thus another
potentially highly fruitful area for future research.103
The imperative of responding to climate change
requires efforts across a range of policy sectors
whose core objectives are not necessarily related.
The literature on the challenges of climate policy
integration in the EU remains relatively small.104
However, the EU’s past experience of how challenging
it can be to shift well-established sectoral objectives
and practices in the interests of environmental policy
integration has already been subject to a great deal
of academic scrutiny, with salutary findings.105 Begun
optimistically in 1998, by late 2002, the production of
new sectoral strategies and/or the updation of existing
ones under something known as the ‘Cardiff Process’,
had effectively ceased, overshadowed by a new focus
on social and economic reform. The EU’s drive for
environmental policy integration was handicapped by
a lack of high-level political leadership, and by its
reliance on a relatively small number of fairly weak
coordination instruments. Sectoral strategies tended to
accumulate in a rather incremental manner, not well
harmonized with one another, a problem exacerbated
by the deeply sectorized nature of EU policy making.
Advocates of climate policy mainstreaming would do
well to draw hard lessons from this experience.
Thus, at the time of writing, policy makers are
becoming more and more preoccupied by the overall
coherence of policy portfolios and instrument mixes
in what has become a steadily more cluttered area of
policy development. Within the mitigation domain,
as Ostrom has noted, one of the disadvantages of
polycentricity is the potential inconsistency between
policies. At the time of writing, the perceived need
to complement the ETS with flanking policies that
can boost—rather than undermine—its effectiveness
is high on the political agenda.106 Somewhat
surprisingly, issues such as these have not attracted
much academic attention, other than from economists
with an interest in policy interactions.107–110 As
one of these has pointed out, the introduction of
the ETS in the first place implied the need for
quite fundamental reviews of Member State climate
programs, only a short period after their introduction
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and regardless of whether existing policies were
working.111 Continuation of existing instruments, or
the introduction of new ones, becomes problematic
because a cap and trade system such as ETS guarantees
the attainment of a particular emission target. Hence,
any instruments which directly or indirectly interact
with the ETS will contribute nothing further to overall
emission reductions as they will simply ‘free-up’
allowances for purchase and use.
The underlying concern for greater coherence
is increasingly one that is common to the mitigation
and adaptation domains. As the perceived need to
address both becomes more pressing, sectors are
becoming less distinct in terms of which are expected
to contribute to mitigation goals (and to what
extent) and which to adaptation. Whether current
institutional arrangements within the Commission
and Member States are able to respond adequately
to this complexity is again a moot point—and thus an
area where academic research could find challenging
new questions, and answers of potentially great policy
relevance. Apart from sectoral, or horizontal issues of
coherence and policy integration to consider, there are
also vertical considerations, across governance scales,
as originally pointed out by Urwin and Jordan,112
and later by Biesbroek et al.113 Mitigation policies
set at higher scales could exacerbate vulnerabilities
or impede adaptation at local level. One such danger
arises from the requirement on Member States to
meet targets for biofuels, if water-intensive biocrop
production takes place in water-scarce or biodiversity-
rich areas. These challenges imply a change in the focus
of scholarship toward greater attention to how the EU
operates not only within the mitigation domain but
also across the adaptation and mitigation domains.
The Political Legitimacy of Policy
Amid all the discussion of targets and instruments, it
is vital to remember that no system of governance—let
alone a relatively young, polycentric one with inchoate
democratic foundations—can possibly hope to endure
unless it is seen to be legitimate by its citizens. The
EU began life as ‘an elitist project’, supported by an
implicit and often quite passive acceptance among
national publics that deeper European integration
was an inherently ‘good thing’ (Ref 24). In recent
years, the EU’s mitigation policies have benefitted
as much as other policy areas from the permissive
consensus in favor of deeper and deeper European
integration. Indeed, the relationship has been two
way: in a political world short of ‘Europe-wide pol-
icy discourses’,114 climate change presented the EU
with a golden opportunity to demonstrate its political
relevance by generating more and more policy out-
puts. In the case of very salient issues such as climate
change, for example, ‘better opportunities for output
legitimacy are hard to imagine’.115
As has so often been the case in the EU, politi-
cians have relied strongly on generating policy outputs
to secure the EU’s legitimacy, and rather neglected the
input side of politics: public participation, delibera-
tion, and open contestation. It is striking that many
of the key decisions on issues such as burden shar-
ing and standards for traded products were made in
highly technocratic fora such as the EU’s labyrinthine
‘comitology’ committees. However, the permissive
consensus has been badly dented in recent years by
a series of referendum defeats, declining turnouts in
European elections, the crisis in the Euro-zone and
rise of anti-EU parties in several Member States. This
trend risks producing something altogether different:
a ‘constraining dissensus’ in relation to all new EU-
wide initiatives.116 In a polycentric setting, the EU
institutions are by definition relatively isolated from
everyday political discourse at the national level; much
of their time is devoted to dealing with special interest
groups that mobilize at EU level to secure selective
benefits. It is they that shape and dominate political
agendas, not citizens, national parliaments or, for that
matter, national political leaders.
More and more, scholars are starting to ask
where this leaves not just climate policy but all poli-
cies after the EU’s ‘near death’ experiences in the early
2010s. As the impacts of climate change become more
pronounced and the financial cost of mitigation and
adaptation stack up, the politics of governing show
every sign of becoming more, not less difficult. If, for
example, the EU moves from 20% to a 30% tar-
get and then, as envisaged, onto something like an
80% reduction by 2050, will European citizens be as
ready to accept ‘Brussels’ intruding into their every-
day choices? Will national politicians be as willing to
pool parliamentary sovereignty on such strategically
important issues as energy supply in the EU? These
are likely to emerge as important questions for future
research. Either way, Member State governments may
find that they have to work a lot harder to carry
their citizens with them. How well they do so could
have important implications not only for the EU’s cli-
mate policies but also, given the EU’s leading position,
long-term global action.
CONCLUSION
To return to the central theme of this article,
climate policy actors in Europe appear on the
whole to have successfully exploited many of the
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opportunities afforded by the EU’s polycentric form,
while minimizing many of its downsides. Lessons
may be drawn from this for policy making in similar
contexts (Refs 82 and 83). The way in which policy
makers have identified the negative aspects and taken
effective steps to deal with them (and in doing so
been regarded as an important example to follow) is
most evident in the history of the ETS, an instrument
which embodied a conscious element of ‘learning by
doing’. Here, in order to minimize the problems
of gaming and free-riding identified by Ostrom
(Ref 10), Member State participants proved willing
to countenance a greater degree of central control.
Member States have also (more or less!) willingly
agreed to differentiated burden (or effort) sharing
targets that, while undoubtedly sources of tension,
are regarded as broadly simple, fair, and transparent
(Ref 2). That Member States were willing to accept
these developments was arguably related to the
prevailing global context, in which the Kyoto targets
provided a strong disciplinary effect, or compliance
pull (Ref 62), although Wettested (Ref 38) suggests
that there were other drivers too.
To the extent that the EU’s ability to make
progress on emission reduction was due to the
pressure deriving from international, treaty-based
commitments, the emergence of a more bottom up,
‘pledge and review’ type of global regime may be a
cause for concern. Thus, while a broadly polycentric
system without strong central leadership has served
the EU well internally, at a global level an analogous
system may not provide a strong and predictable
enough framework to spur radical emission reductions
in Europe.
Moreover, while Ostrom was right to note how
the multiple benefits to be gained from climate policy
at different levels can be exploited in more polycentric
settings, in order to reach the levels of emission
reduction that many scientists suggests is necessary
to stand even a 50% chance of limiting warming
to 2˚C, a far more aggressive set of policies appears
necessary. To date, there has been an undeniable
element of ‘free-riding’ on gratis emission reductions
accumulated in the 1990s, unrelated to climate policy
(Refs 93 and 108). To achieve greater reductions, the
EU cannot continue to rely on amixture of serendipidy
and policies which display obvious co-benefits. How
well its polycentricity will serve the EU in this era
is an open question. Some, such as Skjaerseth and
Wettestad, suggest that the entrepreneurial leadership
role played by the European Commission in the ETS
process is increasingly needed for further development
of EU climate (and environmental) policy. They also
suggest that this type of leadership can be best
exercised by international secretariats more generally
who, owing to their perceived independence, may help
creatively to facilitate common solutions when parties
are locked into intense negotiation battles (Ref 68).
As we have noted, however, much will depend on
whether governments and their publics regard such a
role as legitimate. Meanwhile, adaptation policy has
been characterized by markedly different dynamics, in
which the highlighting of co-benefits may well be an
appropriate strategy to encourage future action. Here
the EU is moving gradually toward a system in which
local, regional, and national efforts are monitored and
reported in a way that allows lessons to be drawn, and
where funding allocated from the centre is assessed to
some degree in terms of its contribution to the EU’s
resilience against climate impacts.
In future, the literature suggests that greater
attention will be directed to how the EU seeks to
manage governance challenges both within and across
the adaptation and mitigation ‘domains’. One of
the most vibrant areas of new research concerns
the underlying explanation for the uneven pattern
of instrument use (noted above), leading to curious
and sometimes rather perverse interactions between
instruments. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive
‘theory of EU policy’ instruments (or even of policy
instruments more generally) that academics and
policy makers can turn to. Indeed, there is not
even a unanimously accepted typology of the main
instruments. Instead of seeking to develop and test
a specific theory of instrument choices in the EU
or engaging in yet more debate about definitions,
some scholars have turned to more general theories
of the policy process. Jordan et al.28 use several of
these and find that none is sufficient but all have
something to offer. Hence, the EU’s ongoing struggle
to govern bymultiple instruments would seem to be an
ideal context in which scholars of policy instruments
and the EU can engage in mutually beneficial theory
development and testing activities.
To conclude, this article has shown that the
evolution of climate policy in the EU has attracted a
huge amount of comment from academics working
both in and well outside Europe. Arguably, the
literature has evolved since the 1980s from a position
where analysts attempted wide-ranging investigations
across the broad sweep of EU climate policy, through
a period when, as policy became more common and
more differentiated, research becamemore specialized,
concentrating on particular instruments (such as the
ETS) or particular governance challenges (such as
how allocate to allocate regulatory costs between
different sectors and regions). We are now back in
a period when scholarship is undergoing a degree of
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
consolidation and synthesis, and broad overviews are
again being attempted (Refs 34, 35, 37, 61)—arguably
reflecting the increasing maturity of the EU’s climate
policy portfolio. Old debates about who or what is
steering EU action—is it the Member States or the EU
institutions?—have been reinvigorated, but clear-cut
answers remain elusive (Ref 38).
Some things are clear, however. First of all,
EU climate policy has definitely not evolved in the
same functionally driven manner as environmental
policy; states have been far too unwilling to cede
control over their tax, energy, and foreign policy
powers to EU institutions. Nevertheless, EU climate
policy has developed well beyond the lowest common
denominator of state preferences. But states remain
an enduringly important focus of research; even in
a young and relatively open system of polycentric
governance, evidently some actors and levels remain
more important than others. Second, EU climate pol-
icy is here to stay, supported as it is by a whole
host of ‘policy takers’ with an active stake in its
continuation,117,118 including clean energy companies
and environmentalists. This outcome, while seemingly
self-evident today, was certainly not preordained, and
indicates just how far EU climate policy has evolved
in the last 40 years.
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